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1. Introduction 
 
 
Do present-day Palestinians living in refugee camps1 have a right to return to their homes 
and to have their property recovered namely in virtue of the history of having been forcefully 
and deliberately expelled from their homeland? This essay presents two comments on 
doubts one might have with respect to the validity of the Palestinian claims to reparation. 
These doubts reflect the two sets of questions that have defined, at least in part, the 
philosophical subject of Historical Injustice: First, the questions arising from the non-identity 
problem as introduced by Derek Parfit in his work Reasons and Persons,2 and, second, the 
questions arising from Jeremy Waldron’s supersession thesis as presented in his article 
“Superseding Historic Injustice”.3 My comments are meant to show that the non-identity 
problem is of little practical significance for assessing the validity of the right of return of the 
Palestinian refugees. And the same is true for the supersession thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
* Paper presented at “International Conference on Israel and the Palestinian Refugees”, Max Planck 
Institute for Comparative Public and International Law, Heidelberg, July 11-13, 2003, forthcoming in 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law XXX (2004). Comments and criticisms most welcome; please send 
them to LHMeyer@barkhof.uni-bremen.de 
1
 I follow Andrei Marmor in assuming that the needs of these refugees are particularly urgent and 
compelling and in stressing that the argument is not restricted to the refugees in the camps. See 
Andrei Marmor, “Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An Embarrassing Challenge for 
Liberal Zionism”, in Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustice, ed. Lukas H. Meyer (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2004), sect. 2, fn. 13, and see fn. 28, below. 
2
 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), part iv. 
3
 Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice”, Ethics 103 (1992), 4-28 (an earlier version of this 
paper was published as “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession”, Justice, Ethics 
and New Zealand Society, ed. Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perrett (Oxford: OUP, 1992); and most 
recently Waldron, “Redressing Historic Injustice”, in Justice in Time (fn. 1, above). Waldron’s 
“Superseding Historic Injustice” is likely the most often discussed and cited paper in the debate 
about the moral validity of claims to reparation owing to historical injustices. David Lyons holds a 
similar view on historical entitlements. See his “The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to 
Land”, Social Theory and Practice 4 (1977), 249-72, republished in Reading Nozick: Essays on 
Anarchy, State and Utopia, ed. J. Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). 
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2. The Irrelevance of the Non-Identity Problem 
 
 
The non-identity problem gives rise to the following general question: how can individuals 
today have a just claim to compensation owing to what was done to others in the past when 
the claimants would not exist today had past people not suffered these harms?4 For 
example, do African Americans, whose ancestors were subjected to the terrible injustices of 
being kidnapped in Africa and subsequently enslaved, have a just claim to compensation?5  
Let us set aside a host of specifically legal questions concerning, for example, the statute of 
limitations and liability. Let us also assume that it is sometimes possible to identify with 
certainty direct descendants of slaves. Consider the case of Robert, who has been identified 
as one such.6  
 
People can make claims to compensation for harms suffered by them. As a descendant of 
slaves, has Robert been harmed owing to the injustices suffered by his ancestors? First, 
consider briefly the most common interpretation of harm7 that requires that the existence of 
the harmed person or people qua individuals is independent of the harming act or policy. 
This interpretation of harm can be expressed in the following formula: 
 
(1) Subjunctive-historical interpretation: An action (or inaction)8 at time t1 harms someone 
only if the agent causes (allows) this person to be worse off at some later time t2 than the 
                                                 
4
 See Christopher Morris, “Existential Limits to the Rectification of Past Wrongs”, American Philo-
sophical Quarterly 21 (1984); Rahul Kumar and David Silver, “The Legacy of Injustice: Wronging 
the Future, Responsibility for the Past”, in Justice in Time (fn. 1, above), sec. 2.1.  
5
 For the claims of descendants of slaves in the USA see, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau, “Compensatory 
Justice and the Black Manifesto”, The Monist 56 (1972), 20-42; Bernard R. Boxill, Blacks and 
Social Justice (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984; revised edition: Rowman und Littlefield, 
1992); Roy L. Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn't Enough. The Controversy over Apologies and 
Reparations for Human Injustice (New York and London: New York University Press, 1999), parts 6 
and 7; Wole Soyinka, The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness (New York: Oxford UP, 
1999), 44-69; Robert Fullinwider, “The Case for Reparations”, Report from the Institute for 
Philosophy and Public Policy 20 (2000); David Lyons “Unfinished Business: Racial Junctures in US 
History and Their Legacy”, in Justice in Time (fn. 1, above). 
6
 See James S. Fishkin, “Justice between Generations: Compensation, Identity, and Group 
Membership”, Compensatory Justice, (Nomos 33), John W. Chapman (ed.) (New York and 
London: NYU Press, 1991), 85-96, 91-93. 
7
 For a discussion of different notions of harm in the intergenerational context see Parfit,  Reasons 
and Persons (fn. 2, above), 487-90; James S. Fishkin, “The Limits of Intergenerational Justice”, in 
Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, ed. Peter Laslett and Fishkin (New Haven and 
London: Yale UP, 1992), 62-83, 63-64; Sheana Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, 
and the Significance of Harm”, Legal Theory 5 (1999), 117-48. 
8
 For a defense of the view that certain types of inactions, namely omissions, can be harmful see, 
e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. Vol. 1. Harm to Others (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), ch. 4. 
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person would have been at t2 had the agent not interacted with (or acted with respect to) this 
person at all.9 
 
According to this interpretation of harm, a person can be understood to be fully compensated 
for an act or policy (or event)10 when she is as well off as she would be if the act had not 
been carried out. According to this interpretation of harm, it is not the case that Robert has 
been harmed for the reason that his ancestors were kidnapped and enslaved. If his 
ancestors had not been kidnapped and enslaved, Robert would not exist today. His 
existence depends on the fact that the genealogical chain was not broken at any point. 
Hence, the initial kidnapping in Africa, the transport to America, and the slavery of his 
ancestors are necessary conditions for Robert’s having come into existence at all. He would 
not have been better off had his ancestors not been badly wronged. Thus, we cannot rely 
upon this interpretation of harm and its accompanying interpretation of compensation in 
claiming that Robert has been harmed and should be compensated; the required state of 
affairs under this interpretation implies the nonexistence of the of the person claiming 
compensation. 
 
To this claim we can respond in a number of ways.11 The response, I find most plausible, is 
to allow for an identity-independent notion of harm in addition to the common identity-
dependent notion of harm.12 Such an identity-independent notion of harm can be expressed 
in the following formula: 
                                                 
9
 “Acted with respect to this person” is meant to include the act that is the cause of this person’s 
existence. It is difficult to interpret such acts as interactions. We prefer “had we not interacted with 
(or acted with respect to) this person at all” to David Gauthier’s “in our absence” (David Gauthier, 
Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 203-05). Both formulations are problematic 
and it is beyond the scope of this entry to discuss their respective problems at length. Gauthier 
himself points out that his formulation runs into difficulty in dealing with situations in which a person 
has assumed a certain social role, e.g., the role of a life-guard that is, in part, defined by positive 
duties vis-à-vis others. If a person assumes such a role her “absence” in a situation where she is 
duty-bound to intervene can render others worse-off (ibid., 205). For the purposes of the 
formulation we prefer it seems plausible to suggest that assuming such a role does constitute an 
“interaction” of the then duty-bound person with those to whom she is bound where fulfilling the 
duties of her role is concerned. 
10
 People can be harmed by events, say, by a natural catastrophe. The following reasoning applies 
when such an event occurs before the person who makes the claim to being compensated owing 
to the event comes into existence. 
11
 Currently living African Americans might well have just claims to compensation based on the 
subjunctive-historical reading of harm because of harm done to them or to their more recent 
ancestors. See my discussion of the claims of the Palestinian refugees, below, and Lyons’ analysis 
of continuing discrimination against African Americans in “Unfinished Business: Racial Junctures in 
US History and Their Legacy” (fn. 5, above). 
12
 See Lukas H. Meyer, “Past and Future: The Case for an Identity-Independent Notion of Harm,” in 
Rights, Culture, and the Law. Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. 
Lukas H. Meyer, Stanley L. Paulson, and Thomas W. Pogge (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003). A different 
type of response relies on a non-consequentialist interpretation of the relation of wronging a person 
and harming a person. If we can wrong a person without harming the person, a person can have a 
claim to rectification without having incurred any harm. A claim to rectification for past wrongs may 
not give rise to the non-identity problem – as Rahul Kumar argues in  “Who Can Be Wronged?”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003), 99-118. For a different interpretation of the ethical 
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(2) Subjunctive-threshold interpretation:13 An action (or inaction) at time t1 harms someone 
only if the agent thereby causes (allows) this person’s life to fall below some specified 
threshold. 
 
Under this interpretation of harm, a person can be understood to be fully compensated for an 
act or policy (or event) if that person does not fall below the specified standard at a particular 
point in time. Robert can be harmed because his ancestors were kidnapped and enslaved. 
Whether Robert has been harmed due to the way his ancestors were treated depends upon 
whether the way they were treated has led to Robert’s falling below the standard of well-
being specified. That this is true in the case of Robert, however, will turn on his current state 
of well-being. Employing this interpretation of harm and its accompanying interpretation of 
compensation requires a forward-looking assessment of what others ought to do today in 
terms of providing measures of compensation.14 When we analyze historical claims on the 
basis of such a subjunctive-threshold interpretation of harm, the normative relevance of past 
wrongs will depend upon their causal relevance for the well-being of currently living (and 
future people). Fulfilling our duties to both the latter might well require compensation for the 
consequences that stem from the fact that their predecessors have been badly wronged. 
That their predecessors were wronged, however, does not in itself give rise to justified claims 
of compensation on the part of their descendants today. 
 
The compensation claims of the Palestinian Refugees are relevantly different, however. The 
non-identity problem is of little practical significance for assessing the validity of the right of 
return of the Palestinian refugees – and for two reasons. First, the non-identity problem does 
                                                                                                                                                        
significance of past wrongs see Lukas H. Meyer, “Obligations Persistantes et Réparation 
Symbolique”, Revue Philosophique de Louvain 101 (2003), 105-22. 
13
 For the wording of these notions of harm see Thomas W. Pogge, “‘Assisting’ the Global Poor”, 
Deen K. Chatterjee (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
14
 The relevance and importance of the forward-looking assessment of the normative significance of 
past wrongs has been stressed by, e.g., Lyons, “The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to 
Land” (fn. 3, above); Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (fn. 3, above); Bruce A. Ackerman, 
The Future of Liberal Revolution (New Haven: Yale UP, 1992), 72-73; Ackerman “Temporal 
Horizons of Justice”, Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), 299-31. For a theory of justice that grounds 
our obligations in backward-looking reasoning see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) 152-53. The theory relies upon counterfactual reasoning. For critiques of 
this theory, see Lyons, “The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land”; George Sher, 
“Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981); Waldron, 
“Superseding Historic Injustice”. For epistemic reasons only, Nozick proposes Rawls's difference 
principle -- a forward-looking principle, specifying what the future should be like -- as a “rough rule 
of thumb for rectifying” historical injustice (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 231). This idea does not 
address the problem of the inapplicability of a non-comparative notion of harm as discussed in the 
text. For alternative impersonal interpretations of how the past matters normatively, see Peter 
Vallentyne, “Teleology, Consequentialism, and the Past”, Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (1988), 89-
101; Thomas E. Hill, “The Message of Affirmative Action”, Social Philosophy & Policy 8 (1990/91), 
108-29; Fred Feldman, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), chs. 1, 4. 
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not arise with respect to surviving victims of wrongs. Among those present-day Palestinians 
living in refugee camps are a good number of those individuals who were forcefully and 
deliberately expelled from their lands by the Israeli fighting forces. The harm done to them 
can be understood in accordance with the common understanding of harm: the Israeli policy 
caused these people to be worse off than they would have been in the absence of that 
policy. These individuals would be fully compensated for the harm done to them were it the 
case that as a result of measures of compensation undertaken they are as well off as they 
would be if the policy had not been carried out. 
 
Second, for the descendants of those who were expelled from their homeland it might well be 
true that they would not exist had their parents and (great-)grandparents not been expelled. 
However, the descendants can be said to be victims of the additional wrong that their parents 
did not receive compensation for the wrongs inflicted upon them. The individual descendants 
can be said to have been harmed from conception or birth because of the lack of sufficient 
compensation to their parents. Again, the harm done to them can be understood in 
accordance with the common understanding of harm: Having forborne from providing 
sufficient measures of compensation to the first generation of Palestinian refugees, those 
entities who stand under the obligation to provide such measures of compensation harmed 
the descendants of the first generation of Palestinian refugees by causing the descendants 
to be worse off than these people would have been had they fulfilled their obligations. And 
again the second generation of Palestinian refugees would be fully compensated for the 
harm done to them were it the case that as a result of measures of compensation undertaken 
they are as well off as they would be if the first generation of Palestinian refugees had 
received the compensation they were entitled to. And this line of argument/claim can be 
similarly extended to the third and fourth generations. 
 
Thus understood the later generations’ claims to compensation do not have to contend with 
the non-identity problem.15 However, the legitimacy of people’s claims can depend upon their 
actions (and inactions) and the impact these have on their well-being. For these actions 
(inactions) can normatively be attributed to people only insofar as they make the decision to 
act (not act) and take responsibility therefor. Then the strength of later generations’ claim to 
compensation -- owing to the failure of providing sufficient measure of compensation to the 
first generation that suffered the initial harm -- is likely to wane over time. The more the 
descendants’ well-being can be attributed to actions or inactions for which they themselves 
or members of the intermediate generations are responsible, the less the hypothetical state 
of affairs that would obtain had the direct victims received adequate compensation is 
relevant16 for the determination of the claims of the indirect victims.17 This insight is, however, 
                                                 
15
 See George Sher, “Transgenerational Compensation” (paper presented at the conference 
Historical Justice, Potsdam, Germany, 19-20 July 2000) (unpublished ms., on file with author). 
16
 Assuming we could know what that state of affairs would be. 
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of little practical significance for assessing the strength of the claims of the descendants of 
the Palestinians who were expelled from their homeland.  Most of them are the children or 
grand-children of the direct victims. The harm done to their ancestors are not ancient. Thus, 
here the descendants’ claim to compensation – based on the harm inflicted on them due to 
the failure of providing adequate compensation for the initial harm -- is strong. 
 
 
 
3. The Irrelevance of the Supersession Thesis 
 
 
Let us now turn to the second source of doubts about the validity of historical claims to 
reparations. Injustices committed against people in the past may not give rise to claims to 
reparations today if such claims can be understood to presuppose an indefensible 
interpretation of property entitlements. David Lyons and Jeremy Waldron argue that the view 
that once we acquire entitlements they continue until we transfer or relinquish them is 
indefensible since there are reasons of principle18 for holding that entitlements and rights are 
sensitive to the passage of time and changes of circumstances. According to Waldron 
entitlement to land is based upon the idea that such entitlement can be an integral part of  
people’s life plans and projects as individuals and as members of groups. Entitlements to 
land can be important for people being able to autonomously realize particular goods of their 
way of life.19 When circumstances change the entitlement might no longer be important in 
that sense or decrease in its normative significance. For example, the entitlement of original 
owners might weaken over time if they are separated from the land. Having been separated 
from the land, entitlement to the land might no longer be important for the original owners 
autonomously realizing their way of life. Thus, generally speaking, entitlements are sensitive 
to background circumstances and they are vulnerable to prescription. As Waldron argues 
property entitlement is a set of claim rights, liberty rights and powers that are 
“circumstantially sensitive”.20 
                                                                                                                                                        
17
 See, e.g., George Sher, “Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 
(1981), 3-17. 
18
 Here we are not concerned with pragmatic reasons for, e.g., statutes of limitations and the doctrine 
of adverse possession. See Marmor, “Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An 
Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal Zionism” (fn. 1, above), sec. 3.1. 
19
 See, e.g., Lukas H. Meyer, “Transnational Autonomy: Responding to Historical Injustice in the 
Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 8 
(2001), 263-301, sects. 10 (discussing the normative significance of sub-sovereign transnational 
control over their homeland for the political and cultural autonomy of the Saami people) and 11 
(discussing the non-territorial claims of the Roma people to securing the status of a minority in the 
countries in which they reside and to recognition as a transnational minority for protecting a group 
identity that transcends national borders). 
20
 Or as David Lyons puts it: “property rights themselves, and not just their exercise or contents, are 
relative to circumstances” (“The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land” (fn. 3, above), 
370).  
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Further, if legitimate entitlement is sensitive to changes in background changes, it is possible 
that the ongoing effect of an illegitimate acquisition and, more generally, of unjust violations 
of rights of others can become legitimate when circumstances change. This is Waldron’s 
principal argument for the thesis that historical injustices may be superseded.21 He gives an 
example in which the violation by one group of the legitimate rights of another group to a 
given waterhole is superseded by ecological catastrophe such that the interlopers acquire a 
right to share what they had wrongly begun to use. In these circumstances, “they are entitled 
to share that water hole. Their use of [the waterhole] no longer counts as an injustice; it is 
now in fact part of what justice now requires. The initial injustice by [the first group] against 
[the second] has been superseded by circumstances”.22  Hence justice may require that 
original owners of land share their land with others and they may be required to share even 
with those who unjustly appropriated the land. However, even if supersession of injustice is 
possible, the claim that it has occured in any given situation “depends on which 
circumstances are taken to be morally significant and how as a matter of fact circumstances 
have changed”.23 The argument for the possibility of supersession rests on a hypothetical 
case of ecological disaster such that the need of others to make use of the resources was 
both extreme and brought about by circumstances beyond their control.  
 
If we assume that the Palestinians were unjustly expelled from their land by the Israeli 
fighting forces and that the appropriation of the land was unjust, it seems implausible that 
these historical injustices are superseded today so that their ongoing effect, namely, Israeli 
exclusive sovereign control of the land is to be considered legitimate.24 Israel cannot 
plausibly claim either to have an extreme need of exercising exclusive sovereign control of 
the land or that such a need has been brought about by circumstances beyond its control.25 
Further and according to Waldron’s account of property rights supersession of the historic 
injustices will turn on whether for the Palestinian refugees loss of their homeland and the lost 
                                                 
21
 See Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (fn. 3, above), 24, and Waldron, “Redressing Historic 
Injustice” (fn. 3, above), sec. 7. The supersession thesis concerns the ongoing effect of past 
injustices only. Claiming that injustices are superseded implies neither that the past unjust 
violations of rights were not unjust nor that they should no longer be considered unjust. Even if 
certain injustices are superseded, we may well stand under obligations to publicly acknowledge the 
wrongs committed and to provide, say, measures of symbolic reparation toward the victims. See 
Meyer, “Obligations Persistantes et Réparation Symbolique” (fn. 12, above). 
22
 Waldron, “Redressing Historic Injustice” (fn. 3, above), sec. 7. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 I do not mean to imply that Jeremy Waldron or David Lyons hold that these more recent injustices 
are superseded. Both claim that some colonial injustices committed two hundred years ago can 
plausibly be said to be superseded given dramatic changes that have taken place. But see Paul 
Patton’s critique of the claim colonial injustices in Australia and New Zealand are superseded. 
Patton, “Colonization and Historical Injustice – The Australian Experiene”, in Justice in Time (fn. 1, 
above), sec. 4. 
25
 See Chaim Gans’ subtly nuanced analysis of the just claims to self-determination of both the 
Jewish and the Palestinian peoples. Gans, “The Palestinian Right of Return and the Justice of 
Zionism”, this vol.; Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), ch. 4. 
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property is of significance for their sense of who they are and want to be. In actuality, the loss 
is highly important to them, namely to their individual and collective identity. We can explain 
this in terms of the importance of a shared communal life that allows the members of an 
ongoing cultural and ethnic group to autonomously participate in the realization of the 
particular goods of their way of life.26 For a people to realize this value they typically need a 
meaningful degree of autonomous control over land and for the Palestinians there is no 
substitute for their homeland available. This is not an atypical situation either.27 Further, and 
as Andrei Marmor has stressed, in the case of the Palestinian refugees the claim to a right to 
return is particularly pressing owing to the miserable conditions under which they live in the 
refugee camps and, as Andrei Marmor puts it, “with very limited opportunities to escape such 
a predicament”.28 In the case of the Palestinian refugees it seems clear that their yearning for 
their lost homes “is not just a sentimental matter”,29 but something which is closely related to 
the person(s)’ individual or communal sense of identity. 
 
This is not to deny the Jewish right to self-determination.30 Also, changes of circumstances 
do matter: a number of considerations can be distinguished that are relevant for specifying 
the contents of the Palestinian right of return and how that right ought to be exercised.31 
These considerations reflect, first, how best to serve the interests underlying the 
Palestinians’ right of return; second, how to respect and accommodate the legitimate 
interests and rights of others who might be affected by recognition of that right; and, third, 
pragmatic or strategic concerns of how best to serve the goal of establishing a legitimate and 
stable political order in the region. This essay does not even attempt to to inquire into these 
normatively and empirically difficult questions. Such an inquiry might lead us to the 
conclusion that (many of) the Palestinians should not return to their homeland, that, instead, 
Israel ought to provide measures of material and symbolic compensation, and that (many of) 
the Palestinians should accept, say, control over the West Bank as a sufficient territorial base 
                                                 
26
 Marmor, “Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal 
Zionism” (fn. 1, above), sec. 3.2. 
27
 See, e.g., Siegfried Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative 
and International Legal Analysis”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 12 (1999), 57-128; Benedict 
Kingsbury, “‘Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: a Constructivist Approach to the Asian 
Controversy”, American Journal of International Law 92 (1998), 414-57; Meyer, “Transnational 
Autonomy: Responding to Historical Injustice in the Case of the Saami and Roma Peoples” (fn. 19, 
above). 
28
 Marmor, “Entitlement to Land and the Right of Return: An Embarrassing Challenge for Liberal 
Zionism” (fn. 1, above), sec. 3.2. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
  See sources cited fn. 25 above. 
31
  See Marmor, fn. 1 above, § 3.3; Andreas Føllesdal, “The Special Claims of Indigenous Minorities to 
Corrective Justice”, in Justice in Time, fn. 1 above, § 4; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, 
and Self-Determination. The Accomodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1990). See especially Alon Harel, “Whose Home Is It? Reflections on the 
Palestinians’ Interests in Return”, Theoretical Inquiries in Law XXX (2004) (Harel argues that the 
Palestinians’ interests correctly understood do not support their right of return, while I would argue 
that they ought to exercise their right of return in a way that reflects, inter alia, (some of) the 
considerations as most helpfully discussed by Harel). 
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for realizing the particular goods of their way of life. However, such a conclusion could not 
rest on the mistaken premise that the Palestinian right of return has been superseded. 
Rather, such a conclusion would reflect either an assessment of how (the) Palestinians ought 
to exercise their right of return. And—or alternatively—it would reflect the view that (the) 
Palestinians have good or even compelling reasons to waive their right of return as a 
measure of political strategy. 
 
 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
The argument presented in this essay has been theoretical and mainly negative: the two 
main sources of theoretical doubt about the validity of claims for reparation owing to past 
injustices do not undermine the validity of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. 
Neither the questions arising from the non-identity problem nor those arising from the 
supersession thesis significantly undermine the Palestinian refugees’ claims to reparations 
and their right of return. First, the common understanding of harm and its accompanying 
notion of reparation and compensation are applicable to those Palestinians who were 
forcefully and deliberately expelled from their homeland as well as to their descendants with 
respect to the harm done to them owing to the lack of effective measures of reparations for 
the initial harm. Second, even if we allow for the conceptual possibility of historic 
supersession of injustices, it seems highly unlikely that the Palestinians’ right of return has 
been superseded. Morally speaking, there does not seem to be a compelling case for 
considering the ongoing effect of the expulsion of the Palestinians from their homeland as 
just given current circumstances. However, the essay does not address the question of how 
the Palestinians ought to exercise their right of return or whether they (or many of them) 
might have good or compelling reasons to to refrain from realizing their right of return. 
Responding to this question would require consideration not only of how best to serve the 
interests underlying the Palestinians’ right of return, but also how to respect and 
accommodate the legitimate interests and rights of others, including the Jewish right to self-
determination. Last but not least, we would need to pragmatically assess how best to serve 
the goal of establishing a legitimate and stable political order in the region. 
 
